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Epistula Dedicatoria Ad Familiares et Patronos:
“De omnibus dubitandum est” – et Renus Descartus et Soren Kierkegardus haec verba
scripserant. Sed sine dubita hoc opus perfectum est per auxilia et beneficentiam amicorum et
doctuorum. Non laboravi solus. Gratiae agendae mihi sunt ad comites philosophicos et classicos
qui mea barbara toleraverant; etiam ad professores meos semper me audientes et errata
praetextata cum venia emendentes; etiam ad meam familiam sine quibus nihil sim. Meum opus
est parvum et nugatorium, et fortasse mundus cum celeritate illius obliturus est. Sapientiora
verba dicta sunt; maiora tracta scripta sunt. Sed spero hoc opus principia philosophica docta
mihi ab professoribus magnis et apud studentes magnos – logicas cogitationes et amorem
inquistionis – satiavisse et credentibus placuisse. Humilis ergo scribo.
“Ea ut aequo animo ferre dignemini, Lectores, oro postuloque.” – Hobbes, De Cive, Praefatio

Dedicatory Epistle to Friends and Patrons:
“All things must be doubted.” Both Rene Descartes and Soren Kierkegaard wrote these words.
But it cannot be doubted that this work was completed through the aid and beneficence of my
friends and teachers. I did not work alone. I must give thank to my fellow majors – both in
philosophy and classics, who put up with my nonsense – to my professors, who always had an
open ear and who always kindly corrected my juvenile wanderings, and finally to my family,
without whom I would be nothing. My work is small and trifling, and perhaps the world will
quickly forget it. Wiser words have been spoken, and better treatises have been written. I hope,
however, that at least this work fulfills the principles of philosophy – logical thinking and love of
enquiry – principles taught to me by great teachers and in the company of great students, and that
it please those who put faith in me. Humbly do I write.
“I pray and beseech, O Readers, that you deign to receive these with equal mind.” – Hobbes De
Cive, Preface
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Introduction to Natural Law:
The world of international relations among polities is complicated and uncertain. Unlike
the domestic realm, in which the constituents of the polity commonly recognize a judge, set of
laws, and oftentimes an ethnic history, the international realm is composed of various and
competing entities which seldom acknowledge standards of behavior. Even when agreements
are reached on the international stage, enforcement of such treaties is haphazard or unclear at
best. Although the contemporary world has produced institutions, such as the United Nations, to
aid in such an uncertain circumstance, the same issues remain: commerce, war, land annexation,
alliance, and humanitarian aid, as had existed since the inception of polities themselves. The
philosophical tradition, in particular, the natural law tradition of the early modern period, has
provided frameworks by which these difficult topics may be better understood.
This paper will focus on international commerce. How should the state reconcile its own
interests with international obligations? Two philosophers, Emer de Vattel of Switzerland and
Thomas Hobbes of England provide two possible solutions. These two philosophers, though
both belonging to the enlightenment era of western philosophy, write at opposite ends of the
movement – Hobbes at its inception, and Vattel at its conclusion. Whereas the latter would be
far more amenable to free trade and open borders, the former would be more skeptical and more
willing to limit trade for the sake of the commonwealth. This paper will work to examine each
philosopher; in regards to Hobbes, a genealogical approach shall be taken – working from the
sociability of man, to the creation of the polity, and finally to the international realm and
commerce. In regards to Vattel, his concept of cosmopolis and moral agency – both of which
inform his international policy – will be examined. Finally, this paper will conclude with an
analysis of each philosopher in relation to each other.
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Natural law is a sub-branch of philosophy which deals with the rules or precepts known
by reason by which man should conduct himself. The agent concerned in natural law may be
either an individual or a polity, though – depending on the philosopher – the rules may differ by
scale. Modern natural law traces its roots back to the Roman Ius Gentium (“Law of the
Peoples”) and jurisprudence, while earlier natural law traditions have Aristotelian or Thomistic
roots. Historically, natural law has played an influential role in international relations and
conceptions of sovereignty. In 1609 CE, Hugo Grotius – a Dutch jurist – published Mare
Liberum (“The Free Sea”) – a seminal work for the field. The treatise contained within it a
nascent argument for free trade, as well as a framework which, although referencing biblical and
theological sources, could entirely be understood by the dictates of reason.2 Grotius still wrote in
the shadow of older traditions; later authors would rely mostly on a secular basis or reasoning.
In a more politically salient manner at the time of its publication, the reasoning in Mare Liberum
was used by the Dutch to justify the seizure of a Portuguese ship and as an attack on the
monopoly held by the Spanish in the East Indies.3 More recently, other works in the natural law
tradition, such as Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, have influenced the creation of
international bodies. Indeed, Kant’s idea of an international “confederacy” composed of
republics may best be seen in today’s European Union.4 Natural law, though it remains mainly
as a historical school of thought in many philosophy departments around the nation, still holds
relevance today; the conditions of polities have not changed so much as to obviate the natural
law tradition.
2

Grotius 2009: xiv (Introduction to text).
Ibid., 11: “…the greatest benefit of nature, that even by the wind she hath mingled nations scattered in regard of
place and hath so divided all her goods into countries that mortal men must needs traffic among themselves.”
Grotius argued that human nations must necessarily trade with one another because no one nation is selfsufficient, additionally, such trade is conducive to sociability. Any violation of free trade, then, warrants retaliation
or restitution.
4
Hunter 2012: 481.
3
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Thomas Hobbes (1588 CE – 1679 CE) is best known as a political philosopher. Hobbes’
most famous work Leviathan lays the groundwork for the modern polity and social contract
theory. Educated at Oxford University, he worked much of his life as a tutor to the aristocratic
Cavendish family, and published – in addition to political philosophy – books on optics, history,
and classics (most notably, his translation of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War).
He corresponded with other thinkers of his day such as Rene Descartes and Marin Mersenne.
During his life, he fled his native England for France because of the tumultuous English Civil
War – an event that many scholars speculate influenced his political philosophy. Many of his
ideas would become the foundation for modern philosophy with concepts such as the egotistic
nature of man and the renunciation of the summum bonum of earlier traditions.5 Hobbes,
unpopular during both his day and even into the contemporary world, has variously been accused
as an atheist and a totalitarian, even earning the title of “Monster of Malmesbury.”6 Although
Hobbes is concerned mainly with the domestic condition of the polity, it is entirely possible to
glean from his works a natural law conception of international relations. The works examined in
his paper by Hobbes shall be his Leviathan and De Cive.
Hobbes is known most famously for his state of nature thought experiment which serves
not only as the foundation for the polity, but also a possible analogue to the international realm.
The state of nature is the pre-civil condition.7 Without government, ius naturale (“natural
right”), which states that each man may do anything to preserve his own life, dominates. The
state of nature is a state of uncertainty because it is a state of equality. Each man is equally liable
to death, regardless of physical strength or mental acuity. The product of each man’s labor is
uncertain because it may easily be stolen; the existence of industry becomes impossible. In order
5

See Leviathan, Chapter XI.
Cambridge Companion to Hobbes 1996: 35.
7
See Leviathan, Chapter XIII.
6

Martir 7

to enter into civil society, man must surrender his ius naturale to the sovereign. Hobbes writes
that there are three reasons for the founding of the polity: Metus (fear of violent death), Cupiditas
(desire of the necessities of life), and Spes (hope for industry). The sovereign, using nineteen
explicated leges naturales (“natural laws”) as a guide, must ensure that the constituents live
better inside the polity than in the state of nature or risk rebellion and dissolution of the polity.
An area of contention is whether or not the Hobbesian state of nature on the individual
level is analogous to the Hobbesian international realm. Hobbes does not explicitly state that a
universal and global government is ultimate the solution to the state of nature, though this would
not necessarily be contradictory to Hobbesian premises. Nonetheless, Hobbes’ political
philosophy operates under the assumption that several polities interact with one another one the
international stage, and thus one of the polity’s duties is to defend its constituents from other
polities. Additionally, this paper would argue that the state of nature among individuals is
different from that the condition among polities because the international pre-civil condition is
much less uncertain and less equal. Unlike individuals, polities may be said to of be differing
powers and capacities.
Trade, a byproduct of the industry for which the polity was founded, then becomes a
possible and a possible benefit to the polity. Hobbes, as a materialist, would welcome the
economic boon which trade would inevitably stimulate, but his stance on commerce would
remain tempered and still somewhat skeptical. There are other considerations which may
warrant the curtailment or regulation of trade by the sovereign. For instance, Hobbesian ideas of
charity and welfare stand to limit commerce because both are essential for the integrity of state.8

8

See Seaman, 1990. “Hobbes on Public Charity & the Prevention of Idleness: A Liberal Case for Welfare,” Polity,
Vol. 23, No. 1, 105-126. Although one may easily mistake a Hobbesian concept of charity as a virtue, it must not be
understood as such. Hobbes understood charity only so far as it would prevent the unrest of the lower classes
against the upper classes – i.e. the cohesiveness of state determines charity, not some innate moral worth.
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It is the fear of regression into the state of nature that motivates the establishment of the polity,
and, therefore, this same fear dictates how trade ought to be conducted. Though the Hobbesian
polity may benefit and even encourage international commerce, it resides with the sovereign,
considering all relevant domestic concerns, to determine the extent and manner of commerce.
Free trade, then, would be only at the discretion of the sovereign.
Emer de Vattel (1714 CE – 1767 CE), unlike Hobbes, wrote almost exclusively on
international relations. Although born technically as a subject of the Prussian king (because
Neuchatel was under the Prussian aegis), Vattel was ethnically and culturally a Swiss. He was
educated at the University of Basel and became a public intellectual who wrote reviews of
enlightenment works (including Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Second Discourse). He would
eventually be appointed as a diplomat for the Elector of Saxony. His most famous piece The
Law of Nations, read by many of the American founding fathers,9 is a handbook that explicates
the duties of polities toward one another. Vattel refined the ideas of internationalism and
international obligation which were first broached by some of his predecessors and teachers such
as Samuel von Pufendorf and Christian Wolff10 – other writers in the natural law tradition. In
contrast to Hobbes, Vattel views man as naturally sociable – a stance which would play an
important role of international commerce. The works examined in this paper by Vattel will be
The Law of Nations.
One of Vattel’s main contributions to the field of natural law and international relations is
the idea of the polity itself as a moral agent and the conception of a cosmopolis – or community

9

Hunter 2012: 481.
Samuel von Pufendorf (1632 CE – 1664 CE) was a German jurist and natural law philosopher. He was the author
of De Jure Naturae et Gentium (and its compendium, De Officio Hominis et Civis). Pufendorf developed a natural
law theory which viewed man as sociable (in contrast to Hobbes). Christian Wolff (1679 CE – 1754 CE) was a
German philosopher and author of Jus Naturae. He advocated for a civitas maxima, or an international world
state.
10
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of states. Vattelian natural law holds that every agent has a right to self-perfection; additionally,
it is natural to strive toward this innate goal. This idea is complicated by the proposition that
polities themselves are moral agents. There are two possible interpretations for what constitutes
such a kind of self-perfection: the conglomeration of its constituents’ goals or a non-reductionist
goal of the polity itself. In either case, the idea of self-perfection of the polity must be reconciled
with the cosmopolis – obligations polities have to one another, such as aiding one another in
times of famine. The interaction of these different factors would yield a nuanced view of
commerce which would seem friendly to free trade.
This paper will now enter into the discussion of the ideas of both philosophers. Hobbes
begins from a stance of skepticism and – though uncertainty lessens as he progresses from precivil to state to international – skepticism continues as a hallmark of his philosophy. To assuage
this uncertainty, his polity is one that ultimately holds regulation over the reins of trade. Vattel,
on the other hand, begins from human sociability. Though he does makes allowances for the
rights of individual polities, the idea of a cosmopolis or “great society” pervades his work.
Trade, in Vattel, is a means to curb unfriendly powers – but ultimately a boon by which all
nations benefit.

Chapter I: Hobbes – From the State of Nature to the Polity
This chapter proceeds chronologically from the Hobbesian view of human nature to the
natural condition of man and then concludes with the foundation of the polity and its role.
Hobbes may best be categorized as a skeptical philosopher, at least in regards to the previous
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philosophical traditions. He does not accept the premises of earlier Aristotelian and Thomistic
strains of thought which stress the summum bonum – or an objective teleological goal of civil
society. Instead, Hobbes attributes the creation of polity to the prevention of the brutish and
dismal state of nature – a condition of perpetual war. The polity exists so that its constituents
may pursue their own diverse and ultimately arbitrary passions. He stresses the necessity of
economic well-being, correct explication of terms as defined by the sovereign (because they do
not exist external to the polity), and creation of a tolerant environment.
Human Nature and the Natural Condition
Hobbesian skepticism is prevalent in his view of speech and language; the use of
language is merely to connect an idea with a particular kind of common experience – there are
no universals in the Hobbesian system. Ancient philosophy holds that there are certain objective
immutable principles in reality. Platonic forms and Aristotelian teleology are the exemplars of
this trend. Hobbes holds no such contentions. The world is by nature a set of fundamentally
random and arbitrary occurrences and objects with no set blueprint or goals:
Nominum alia sunt Propria, significantia rem unam singularem; ut Petrus, Iohannes, hic homo,
haec arbor. Alia autem multis rebus sunt Communia; ut Homo, Equus, Arbor; nam
unumquodque eorum, etsi unicum sit, multarum tamen rerum particularium nomen est. Respectu
autem omnium illorum particularium, vocatur universale. Nihil enim in rerum natura universale
est praeter rerum vocabula; nam res nominatae sunt omnes Individuae & Singulares.11
Some names are proper, signifying a singular thing, such as Peter, John, this man, this tree.
Other names, however, are common to many things, such as man, horse, tree, for each one of
these, although it may be one word, nevertheless, is the name for many particulars. In regards,
however, to the all of these particulars, [this word] may be called a universal. Nothing, however,
in nature is universal before the naming of these things; for all things named are individual and
singular.
Common names refer to particular instances of a universal class or category. For instance,
“Thomas Hobbes” is a particular of the “human” class. This universal category “human” refers
11

Leviathan, Chapter IV, 53; Tuck edition, 26.
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not only to “Thomas Hobbes,” but also all other particulars of the same class – such as
“Benedictus Spinoza” or “Jean-Jacques Rousseau.” Hobbes, however, acknowledges that this
larger class of “human” is itself a kind of construct. “Human” is understood to signify a biped,
mammalian creature – not because there is such a thing as “humanity” or “human-ness,” but
rather because it has been agreed upon to signify such by convention and practice. Eventually,
Hobbes would argue that the sovereign is the most practical definer of terms. Hobbes is
skeptical as to whether or not such a class may be known; instead, such designations are created
solely for utilitarian purposes, so that humans may communicate and contract with one another.12
In the natural condition, there is no practical way to organize these particulars properly into
universal classes; the natural condition is an epistemic cacophony.
Continuing from the lack of universals and goals in nature, Hobbes maintains that the
passions of man behave in a similar manner; the passions, though diverse, have no ultimate goal.
Human happiness is not static (“Foelicitatem non consistere in tranquillitate sive requie animi” –
“Felicity does not consist in the repose of a mind in tranquility”), but rather “Felicitas progressus
perpetuus est ab una Cupiditate ad alteram” – “Felicity is the endless movement from one desire
to another.”13 Lacking any preordained purpose, these desires – and the progressions from one
to another – are various, endless, and dependent on the inclinations of each man. Man, so long
as there is breath in his body, is in a state of continual want; this desire terminates only in death.
It cannot be denied that such a view of human nature is somewhat pessimistic, but the
state of nature is worse still – it is a condition of perpetual war. Before the founding of civil
society, humans in the state of nature possess ius naturale – natural right. Natural right may be

12

Hobbes may be interpreted as a “Machiavellian” in this sense – i.e. the sovereign’s ability to define terms is
merely a power play and a means by which the constituents may be better controlled. This, however, does not
necessarily encompass the whole truth. Language is an epistemological, as well as a political concern.
13
Leviathan, Chapter XI, 151; Tuck edition, 70.
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best understood as absolute liberty – it is each man’s right to do whatever he deems necessary,
including murder and pillage, to preserve his own life.14 This right is responsible for the dismal
state of nature. Industry cannot prosper because the fruits of labor are always uncertain and
always subject to theft. No man has any incentive to develop tools or stockpile food because he
cannot reasonably trust his neighbor to respect his right of his possession. Additionally, man’s
only recourse to any injury is violence because there is no common judge to whom he may
appeal. Hobbesian skepticism is seen here once again; man, even though he is not naturally evil,
must act in a hostile manner to preserve himself in such a state of distrust and uncertainty.
Although men in the natural condition may not be battling one another in every instance, the
perpetual threat of combat nevertheless constitutes war: “Consistit enim natura Belli, non in
pugna, sed in tractu aliquo temporis, quo durante Voluntas Armis decertandi est manifesta” –
“the nature of war consists not [only] in fighting but in any tract of time in which the intention of
fighting by arms is made known.”15 Indeed, coupled with Hobbes’ view of happiness or felicity,
such a natural condition of war is perhaps the most antagonistic to man’s prospering. The fear of
reversion to the state of war, or natural condition among individuals since the two are nearly
indistinguishable, is one a cornerstone of Hobbesian political philosophy.
The state of nature is also one of extreme equality; each man, because of uncertainty, is
equally liable to death. Hobbes is willing to assert that, by nature, some people possess greater
talent in certain fields than others. For instance, one man may be naturally gifted in physical
prowess, while another is more skilled in cleverness and the faculties of mind. The uncertainty
of the natural condition, however, erases these distinctions and reduces all men to equality. The
weakest man – “vel dolo, vel conjunctione cum aliis” – “by treachery or confederacy with

14
15

Leviathan, Chapter XIV, 199; Tuck edition, 91.
Leviathan, Chapter XIII, 193; Tuck edition, 88.
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others” – may nevertheless overpower or even murder the strongest.16 Man, always vulnerable
to natural infirmities such as disease or sleep, is especially vulnerable in the state of nature – in
which there is no protection but one’s own strength. This equality is oppressive in that it
prevents the development of industry and arts; additionally, it exacerbates the uncertainty of the
natural condition.
Founding of the Polity:
Man may escape the natural condition by creating a polity.17 The sovereign, or
Leviathan, is the means by which man maintains the civil condition and staves off the state of
nature. The polity is created by transferring natural right to either a single man or a body of
people who would rule in the name of the constituents.18 For Hobbes, the polity is founded and
maintained for three reasons: fear, desire, and hope – “Passiones quibus homines ad Pacem
perduci possunt, sunt Metus praesertim vero Metus Mortis violentae, & Cupiditas rerum ad bene
vivendum necessariarum, & spes per industriam illas obtiendi.” – “The passions by which men
are able to be led to peace are fear, especially fear of violent death, desire of the necessities of
life, and hope for industry of obtaining them [i.e. the necessities].”19 In essence, these three
passions symbolize the shortcomings of the state of nature; they represent the “detrimental” part
of natural right. Natural right allows man liberty to preserve himself, but this liberty of one man
is potentially detrimental to the life of another (accounting for the Metus). The uncertainty of the
natural condition also prevents the fulfilment of the cupiditas and spes. Additionally, the

16

Leviathan, Chapter XIII, 189; Tuck edition, 87.
Hobbes, although he states that fear may be the basis for the polity, does not explicitly state the movement
from state of nature to civil society – i.e. the manner or process by which people transfer natural right. Instead,
scholarship has suggested that Hobbes wrote Leviathan not for people moving from status naturae, but for
sovereign hoping to prevent regression to such a state (Seaman 1990: 124). Leviathan may then be seen not as a
practical handbook for the creation of a polity out of nothing, but as a justification for and a tool for maintaining it.
18
Leviathan, Chapter XVII, 254; Tuck edition, 117. .
19
Leviathan, Chapter XIII, 197; Tuck edition, 90.
17
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sovereign must enforce contracts among its constituents and define the terms by which the polity
may conduct itself.20 The sovereign must attempt to maintain the natural liberty of each
individual, but curtail it when it becomes damaging to others.
The Hobbesian polity is one that makes allowances for material well-being, but the main
role of the polity is the curtailment of human passions in so far as it reduces fear. Scholars such
as Leo Strauss argue that the polity is a response to the problem of uncontrolled human passions:
“Only the State is capable of keeping pride down in the long run, indeed it has no other raison
d’etre except that man’s natural appetite is pride, ambition, and vanity.”21 It cannot be argued
that material conditions of the state of nature are better than in the civil condition; in the former,
industry is rendered completely impossible by uncertainty, while industry is at least possible in
the latter. Industry – i.e. progression of the sciences – is merely secondary, an added boon, to the
purpose of state. The Hobbesian polity is one that, at the basest minimum and in necessity,
preserves the integrity of itself, and the basal material existence of its constituents. It is, in
essence, a large organization that curtails the appetite of all for the sake of all.
Although the sovereign has no juridical obligation to protect the interests of its
constituents, it is limited both by practical and prudential concerns – mainly the constituents’
right of rebellion. The leges naturales – or natural laws – are the precepts by which a prudent
sovereign rules.22 Although they lack any juridical weight (i.e. constituents, in the Hobbesian
system, cannot bring the sovereign to court over the violation of these laws), the natural laws are
offered by Hobbes as a kind of outline for an ideal sovereign. In total, there are 19 natural laws –
varying from checks on pride (the sovereign must not be overbearing) to limits on expansionist

20

Leviathan, 221: “Lex Natruae tertia: Praestanda esse Pacta” – “The third natural law: contracts must be fulfilled;”
Tuck 100.
21
Strauss 1961: 13.
22
Leviathan, Chapter XIV, 199; Tuck Edition 91.
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land policies.23 Nevertheless, Hobbes acknowledges that constituents of the polity still maintain
the right of rebellion: “Si quis seipsum non defensurum esse contra vim paciscatur, Pactum
invalidum est” – “A pact, if anyone agrees to not defend himself from force, is invalid.”24 A
citizen, even in the state of society, maintains some semblance of natural right. Should a polity
threaten the citizen’s life or bodily constitution, natural right is resumed and the citizen may act
against the polity. On a macroscale, i.e. should the state of society degenerate to such an extent
that it is worse than the state of nature, this would likely mean open rebellion and dissolution the
polity itself. This retention of the right of rebellion is the most salient check on a polity’s
actions.
Purpose of the Polity:
More specifically, the Hobbesian polity is responsible for the definition of terms, the
creation of a tolerant environment, and a base economic living standard (as an extension of
natural right).
As aforementioned, Hobbesian epistemology is highly skeptical; it is the responsibility of
the sovereign to define the terms by which the constituents of the polity may conduct themselves
– both on a practical level (for the contracting of economic arrangements) and general
epistemological principles such as truth. The sixth natural law explicitly states that the sovereign
must define terms: “Summae Potestati adhaeret, quae ad conservationem vel violationem Pacis
tendunt decernere, & quando, quatenus, quibus apud multitudinem concionari permittendum sit,
& qui libri publicandi, & a quibus examinandi sint.” – “It is allotted to the Sovereign to discern
what is conducive and detrimental to the conservation of peace, and when, to what extent, and by
what means anyone would be permitted address the masses, and who should examine books

23
24

Leviathan, Chapter XV.
Leviathan, Chapter XIV, 215; Tuck 98.
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about to be published.”25 Since nature, for Hobbes, is composed of a multitude of particulars, the
sovereign must determine how to categorize these particulars into constructed universal classes
for the sake of common communication among the constituents of the polity. This idea may
seem foreign to those in the Anglosphere because no such government institution exists in any
Anglophonic polity (despite Hobbes being one of the most well-known English philosophers).
Nevertheless, such an institution may best be exemplified by the Académie Française – a French
government agency which regulates language, both grammar and vocabulary. Such an
institution is necessarily Hobbesian; it represents an imposition of human constructs on
cacophonous nature. The definitions and terms propagated by the sovereign are maintained by
political power; though it need not be articulated in a government agency, in a Hobbesian
commonwealth, the sovereign is the ultimate source of authority on language. On a practical
level, this serves a utilitarian standard; trade, for example, may homogenized and facilitated by a
common system of weights and measurements (such as the definition of a pound or kilogram).
On a more philosophical level, a common language would facilitate discussion of ideas, and even
truth.26
The state of nature – a state of absolute liberty – is paradoxically a state in which the
actual practice and enjoyment of liberty is largely curtailed (because of uncertainty, distrust,
etc.); the sovereign must create a “tolerant” environment in which actual liberty may, as much as
it may be able to, practiced by the constituents. Hobbes may be seen as a precursor to
conception of modern liberalism and toleration. Hobbes, in dismissing the premise of a summum
bonum, allows for the pursuit of the diverse passions and desire of each individual. The pursuit
of these desires, however, is limited in so far as the pursuit does not present a threat to the
25

Leviathan, Chapter XVIII, 272; Tuck edition, 124.
To be fair, a Hobbesian conception of truth is merely a “relation of words” – i.e. an internal and logical
consistency within a given philosophical system (Elements of Logic, Chapter III)

26
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stability of the polity. The Hobbesian polity is one that promulgates “negative” rather than
“positive” laws: “Reliqua Civium Libertas dependet a Legum Silentio. Ubi enim non definit
Lex, unicuique faciendi vel non faciendi Libertas est.” – “Remaining liberty depends on the
silence of law. When [the sovereign] does not define a law, the liberty belongs to each men –
whether to do or not to do.”27 This kind of relation may be understood as the contemporary
relationship between the United States’ federal and state governments; although federal law
reigns supreme over state law, if there is no specific federal law, the state retains liberty on that
topic. A Hobbesian constituent, if his sovereign does not specify a law, has full discretion to act
in whatever manner that seems fitting to him or herself – thereby allowing the constituent to
pursue whatever desired passion. Hobbes, however, maintains sovereign’s right of censorship to
maintain public order and stability.28 Judd Owen, a Hobbesian scholar who writes on liberty in
the polity, maintains that ideas such as radical Islam, communism, anarchism, and other political
ideologies that threaten the idea of modern liberalism and toleration would be ideas that would
Hobbes would likely censor.29 This conception of censorship, however, seems reasonable; ideas
which threaten the foundation of any given polity may justly be curtailed for the sake of stability.
The Hobbesian sovereign recognizes that gross economic inequality is indeed an issue
that may lead to the dissolution of the polity itself; as such, the Hobbesian scheme makes
allowances for redistribution, charity, and public works. In Chapter XI of Leviathan, Hobbes
recognizes that “needy” men are inclined towards war because of their penury.30 This
proposition holds true also in the state of society; the poor, in destitution, pose a risk of rebellion
to the polity. The polity, to discourage sedition and dissonance between the rich and poor, would
27
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prudentially provide at least some basic economic standard. Additionally, contemporary
Hobbesian scholars are receptive to the idea that public welfare may be just compensation for the
transferring of natural right to the sovereign.31 The base economic minimum may then be seen
as a kind of continuation of natural right in the polity and a fulfillment of the Hobbesian promise
of spes per industriam. It would seem likely that Hobbes would prefer public works (e.g.
building of roads) to public charity (e.g. welfare checks) because the former contributes to the
accumulation of wealth of the polity as a whole (and would be consistent with potentially
Hobbesian idea of mercantilism32), while the latter may be lambasted as unfair “handouts” to the
poor by the working classes (and therefore create animosity in the polity). The concept of a base
economic minimum, however, must be seen as a contingency of society – not as a necessary
condition. This minimum, in a Hobbesian sense, is constructed for the sake of the integrity of
the polity. It should be seen as a logical continuation of the Hobbesian scheme, brought about in
complex societies, rather than a necessary feature.
The issue of resolving inequality by means of redistribution or public action necessarily
involves issues of property rights; Hobbes holds that property is held by constituents at the
behest of the sovereign – recent scholarship specifies further that this economic minimum may
be determined by a given society. Plausibly, the solution to gross economic inequality is
redistribution or some kind of public intervention on behalf of the indigent. In either case, public
funds (i.e. tax revenues) would be required, therefore, a Hobbesian solution is likely to be a
redistributive scheme, involving taxation (i.e. appropriation of private property). The Hobbesian
sovereign may rightly and justly seize any property of any constituent because property exists
only in civil society (and not in the state of nature): “Summae Potestatis Ius est, regulas
31
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praescribere, quibus, quid sit suum unusquisque sciat & fruatur….” – “It is the right of the
sovereign to legislate the laws by which each man knows and enjoys his own [goods]…”33
Though the typical restraint of the right of rebellion retained by constituents still applies,
redistribution in the Hobbesian scheme would not be unheard of and quite preferable to the
disdain of the penurious of the polity. Since property exists under the aegis of polity, the
sovereign may justifiably create a base economic minimum which may be standardized among
all constituents for the sake of reducing inequality which may lead to dissolution of the polity.
What exactly is the extent of the Hobbesian minimum economic standard? Hobbes himself
never specifies in any of his works (though he does enumerate the enjoyment of certain natural
and common goods, such as water and air).34 Recent scholarship suggests that, given the
differing levels of economic development of societies (e.g. agricultural vs. industrial), economic
minimum would depend on the material conditions of society.35 This would allow for a more
flexible interpretation of the Hobbesian economic interest in propping up the poor.
Conclusion:
The Hobbesian system begins from epistemic skepticism. Hobbes is skeptical of the
kinds of knowledge that may be known, especially in regards to final ends or purpose. Ius
naturale makes the natural condition one of distrust and uncertainty – which ultimately
degenerates into a brutish state of perpetual war. The Hobbesian polity is a solution to both these
problems. By transferring natural right to a sovereign, individuals are granted a common
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vocabulary by which they may conduct themselves in business transactions, a tolerant
environment in which (to an extent greater than in the natural condition) they may pursue their
passions, and even a base economic living standard. It is important to note that the state of
nature is a guiding principle in the Hobbesian scheme; it is the litmus test by constitutions may
decide whether or not to exercise the right of rebellion. These considerations – common
vocabulary, economic opportunity, and a limited kind of liberty exercised in tolerance – would
play an important role in the regulation of international commerce. Although economic and
material conditions would play important roles in the purpose and formation of state, the
Hobbesian polity has at its base a baser purpose: preservation and safety of the individual – trade
then becomes secondary to this goal. This stance will be contrasted later with Vattel’s view,
which determines a moralistic view of trade.
Chapter II: Hobbes – International Condition or Status Inter Civitates
Hobbes does not explicitly elucidate a natural law philosophy in regards to international
relations and commerce. Instead, it is necessary to glean and deduce, from his domestic political
scheme, theorems which would apply on the international level. The state of nature scenario
among individuals differs in three integral ways from the condition among polities in the
international realm: the composite nature of the polities, the presence of domestic industry, and
the absence of equality. These distinctions play an important role in how the polity would
conduct commerce with outside powers; since the condition of its citizens is the state’s sole
purpose, commercial activity with other states becomes a function of domestic concerns – both
in terms of material well-being and general character of its people.
Similarities between Status Naturae et Status Inter Civitates:
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Although ultimately distinct, the status inter civitates [the international condition]36
shares some similarities with the state of nature – namely in the lack of central authority. A
polity does not have the ability to contract or create meaningful agreements with other polities.
There is no central power to which polities may appeal should a contract go unfulfilled.
Additionally, there is no common language or set of terms terms by which the various polities
may adequately communicate. Both these issues, though solved inside the polity, continue to
exist in the status inter civitates. It is for these reasons that Hobbes would state that: “Reges
tamen & Personae summam habentes potestatem, omni tempore hostes inter se sunt. Semper
enim alii aliis suspecti sunt, more stantes gladiatorio…quae east conditio Belli.” – “Nevertheless,
Kings and Persons holding the power of state are enemies at all times. Always are they
distrustful to one another, standing in the posture of gladiators.”37 The uncertainty, however, is
of a mitigated kind. The succeeding section will address the differences.
Although international bodies such as the United Nations exist in the contemporary world
exist, the Hobbesian international condition of uncertainty still exists because such a body does
not have the might and power of an actual polity. In the previous Latin quote, Hobbes equates
state power with summam potestatem – or the “highest power.” The United Nations lacks the
dexterity and efficiency in enforcing its own laws and mandates upon its constituent members.
The polities which compose the United Nations have not surrendered their own sovereignty and
therefore continue to retain independence – which is evident by each state’s ability to selflegislate. In order to be properly considered a world government, the United Nations would
likely have to be transformed into something much more akin to the United States – which each
law is enforced by force (if necessary) from a central government.
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Differences between Status Naturae et Status Inter Civitates:
The polity, unlike an individual, is a composite construct which may be destroyed by
both internal and external forces. An individual in the state of nature is subject only to external
impediments or foes (other individuals, wild animals, etc.). A polity, on the other hand, must
worry about not only external powers (e.g. other polities) but also internal factions in the status
inter civitates. As aforementioned in the previous section, individuals under a sovereign still
legitimately retain the right of rebellion, should the political condition deteriorate to such an
extent that the state of nature becomes more appealing than to live under a polity. Additionally,
sedition – which may be defined as the right of rebellion misused (e.g. rebelling for personal
interest or ambition) – remains a constant threat, even to well-regulated states. Polities, then, are
limited more than individuals in the manner in which they may act. Status inter civitates would
be similar to the individual’s state of nature, if the individual would worry about his or her own
internal organs rebelling, in addition to other individuals.
The status inter civitates is further distinguished from the state of nature by the lack of
natural equality. Among individuals, regardless of natural capacities, all men are equal because
of uncertainty. Polities, on the other hand, vary widely. There are natural differences, such as
geography and presence of natural resources, as well as artificial or human-made differences,
such as differences in population or progress in technologies. Corollary to this idea is that
polities are not as easily or as uniformly destroyed as individuals. Whereas individuals suffer
physical infirmities (e.g. sleep, sickness, hunger) of human life, polities possess more durable
artificial life: “…ad conservationem Civitatis necessaria erat Artificialis vita, sine qua post
aetatem unam, moriente Monarcha Civitas omnis interiret. Vita autem haec Artificialis ea east,
quam vocant Ius Sucessionis.” – “Artificial life is necessary for the conservation of the polity,
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without which – after one generation, with the monarch dying – the entire polity would perish.
Moreover, this life is artificial, which they call the right of succession.”38 The right of
succession, in some sense, grants the polity a kind of immortality. Should the sovereign –
whether king or assembly – be destroyed, the polity would continue to exist. The polity, then, is
not as easily dissolved as an individual is killed.
Finally, unlike in the state of nature, the status inter civitates has developed industry.
The uncertainty of the state of nature is absent when a polity is formed. Although it is true that
each sovereign continues to exist in uncertainty in relation to other sovereigns, the constituents
under each respective sovereign have been guaranteed a certain amount of safety because the
sovereign has created institutions by terms may be defined and justice administered. In the worst
case – in which each polity is completely insulated, never coming into contact with one another –
there is at least industry and trade on the domestic level. It may then be assumed that, even in
this extremely isolationist condition, human existence is still preferable materially than the state
of nature.
The Hobbesian polity is one that would engage in international trade, but only with much
reservation. One must remember the purpose of state set forth by Hobbes: the prevention of
violent death, the desire for necessities, and hope for industry. These goals may easily be
fulfilled on a domestic level without any international interference. The status inter civitates,
although existing in uncertainty, exist not in the brutal perpetual war as the state of nature among
individuals. The commonwealth would enter into trade, so long as the trade remains beneficial
to its citizens. Such trade, however, is not mandatory and would only be pursued at the behest of
the sovereign.
The Commonwealth and Human Nature:
38

Leviathan, Chapter XIX, 299; Tuck edition, 135.

Martir 24

The continuous acquisition of material goods by individuals in the state of nature is not
indicative of human nature itself, but rather it is a response to the uncertainty and scarcity of the
pre-civil condition. On a domestic level, the polity establishes the rules by which people may
conduct themselves and pursues industry. On an international level, although there remains
much uncertainty, industry is maintained and trade may be pursued. In his work De Cive,
Hobbes writes: “Frequentissima autem causa quare homines se mutuo laedere cupiunt, ex eo
nascitur, quod multi simul eandem rem appetent, qua tamen saepissime neque frui communiter,
neque diuider possunt; vnde sequitur fortiori dandam esse quis autem fortiori sit, pugna
iudicandum est.” – “The most frequent reason why men desire to hurt one another mutually is
born out of this, that many at the same time seek the same thing, which most of the time they
cannot enjoy in common, nor divide, from which it follows that it must be given to the stronger,
and whoever is stronger is determined by battle.”39 This adequately describes the state of nature
among individuals, but not the status inter civitates. The conveniences afforded by the sovereign
– safety guaranteed so that industry may be pursued, definition of terms so that agreements may
be contracted, and enforcement of contracts themselves – drastically change these circumstances.
Scarcity no longer exists because of industry and technology has alleviated material concerns.
Additionally, since constituents live under a sovereign (i.e. a polity with its accompanying
organizations such as military, courts, etc.), the fear and uncertainty regarding violent death is
largely mitigated, if not completely curtailed.
Although Hobbes attributes to man an antagonistic and power-hungry appetite, the
purpose of state should be to curtail this appetite for the benefit of all. In the opening chapters of
the Leviathan, Hobbes writes that man seeks all things: “Primo ergo loco pono, Morem omnium
hominum esse, ut perpetuo atque indesinenter Potentiam unam post aliam per omnem vitam
39
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persequantur.” - “Therefore, I posit in the first place that the manner of all men is that they
ceaselessly and perpetually seek throughout all their lives one power after another.”40 The
natural inclinations of men, then, are destructive towards peace because they tend to be rapacious
and insatiable. The Hobbesian natural laws, however, incline men, i.e. the citizens as
individuals, to more peaceable ends: “Officium Imperantis est, ut Cives Iustitiam doceantur: id
est, ut primo, ne quis Civis Civem alium occidat, aut copori damnum inferat sine Authoritate
pulica.” – “It is the duty of the one commanding [i.e. the sovereign] that the citizens be taught
justice: that is, firstly, citizens should not kill one another, nor inflict damage upon the body [of
another citizens] without public authority.”41 The inclination of man to seek power after power
is curbed in civil society; instead, the sovereign teaches man to be more peaceable to one
another, reserving the use of force solely to the commonwealth.
Civil society, in its barest sense, must provide the benefits of communal life while at the
same time preserving natural right. As aforementioned, freedom may be detrimental when taken
to an extreme in the state of nature (i.e. ius naturale sine restrictioibus); the polity must sterilize
this freedom – so that industry may emerge: “Legum Civilium ferendarum Finis erat restrictio
Iuris Naturalis, sive Iuris omnium in Omnia, quo stante, pax nulla esse potuit.” – “The purpose of
civil laws is the restriction of natural right, or the right of all in regards to all, by means of which,
no peace is able to be possible.”42 Admittedly, this is a rather libertarian interpretation of
Hobbes. The role of laws, then, is solely to limit natural right (or liberty) for the sake of
preserving the peace of polity. Articulated in a different fashion, civil laws should ensure that a
citizen enjoys freedom only so far as this freedom does not infringe upon another. For instance,
a musician’s freedom to practice violin only extends so far as it does not disturb others. Indeed,
40
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this conception of law facilitates the spes per industriam – or the hope of industry. It is
conception of law and liberty that distinguishes the state of nature and the civil condition.
Scholars have pointed to Hobbes as an early advocate of modern liberalism: “the purpose of state
is not to encourage or legitimize the subordination of the weak by the strong, but rather to give
individuals the opportunity to utilize their peaceful, creative, and non-adversarial powers to
develop the benefits of civilization.”43 Hobbesian state of nature is barbaric and lacking in
resources, but Hobbesian civil society is much more peaceful and plentiful.
Many benefits of society, however, are themselves products of society – completely
unknown in the state of nature. In the state of nature, man knows nothing of the advantages of
community; he does not know trade, community, contract, or other concepts that exist only civil
society. It is from the sovereign, from the establishment of the polity, that these concepts be
known. One may argue, however, that – although such benefits accrue from society, it would
just as easily be possible that passions or desires also come about in this manner, i.e.
artificially.44 For instance, in contemporary society, it would be unimaginable for a professional
of any type (professor, lawyer, doctor, etc.) to be able to properly fulfill his job without a
computer or the internet; in this sense, the passions or desires for electronic apparatus are
artificial in so far as they do not exist in the state of nature. Although this concept is tangential
to this thesis, it must nevertheless be argued that the certain passions persist from the state of
nature into the state of city – e.g. the need for the necessities of life (water, food, etc.) are just as
easily felt by professionals in civil society as man in the state of nature; it is these basal passions,
contained within human nature, which the polity at its barest must maintain.
The Commonwealth and Commerce:
43

Hayes 1998: 74.
This is a common theme taken up by later thinkers, e.g. Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Second Discourse on the
Origins of Inequality.
44

Martir 27

The Hobbesian commonwealth would be one that engages guardedly in commercial
activity, merely out the material necessities. Hobbes writes that any polity may benefit from
international trade: “…sed Commutatione, vel Bello, vel Labore, (nam etiam labore hominum,
non minus quam res aliae cum bonis aliis quibuscunque commutabiles sunt) bonorum Nativorum
defectum supplent.” – “…but by exchange, or by war or by labor (for the labors of men are
commodities not less things exchangeable for whatever other benefits) are deficiencies of native
goods supplemented.”45 Whether or not a polity is able to be completely insulated in
international commerce and exchange matters little; even under the case that a polity should be
able to provide wholly for its material necessities, indubitably would it be able to benefit from
international exchange. This benefit is merely borne from the principle of specialization. For
instance, Spain may be able to supply itself with all its wine needed, merely by its own
vineyards. It would, however, be more beneficial materially that Spain import French wine, and
instead use its vineyards for another plant or crop. On a macroscale, if every polity would
specialize in one product, every polity would be able to cheaply create its one product and
exchange for other products, rather than every polity attempting to be self-sufficient.
The condition and terms of trade are ultimately at the determined by the sovereign.
Hobbes writes that trade and international commerce are to be regulated by the commonwealth
for the sake of the constituents, who may pursue their passions inefficiently:
Ad eandem Summan Potestatem pertinet quae Bona, & in quas terras, Civis vel Civium numerus
quicunque exportabit, & quae importabit definire. Nam si uncuique in hac re suo ipsius arbitrio
uti permitteretur, non deessent qui lucre sui causa hostibus ea venderent, quibus Civitati nocere
possent, eaque importarent quae Civibus fortasse grata, sed noxia vel saltem inutilia essent. Ad
Summan ergo Potestatem pertinet tum de locis, tum de materia negotiandi constituere.
To define the commodities which any citizen or number of citizens will export into foreign lands
and import [into domestic lands] belongs to the same sovereign. For if, to each man, it were
permitted that he be judge of himself in this matter, there would not be lacking those who would
45
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sell things, by means of which [the enemy] would be able to hurt the commonwealth, to the
enemy for their own benefit, and [those who would] import things which perhaps pleasing to the
citizens, but would be noxious or at least useless. Therefore, to approve [the things] concerning
both the places and materials of commerce belong to the sovereign.46
The sovereign then should control reins of international trade not only for the sake of sustaining
the commonwealth (prevention of goods which may be used by hostibus) but also for the health
or welfare of the citizens (prevention of imported products, either useless or dangerous). It is not
the demand of domestic consumers or other market forces that dictate what is imported or
exported, but office of the sovereign. This may be seen as an extension of Hobbesian policy, in
regards to the protection which the sovereign should provide to the citizenry. Just as the
Leviathan should defend its subjects from the coercion or violence of other polities, so too
should this protection apply to products which may prove to be detrimental to the citizens.
Additionally, just as in a state of nature without the sovereign, people are consumed by their own
passions (or, the collective desiring and pursuing of passion by all), so too would people be
likewise consumed by noxia [detrimental commodities], should they remain without the
guidance and regulation of the sovereign in commercial matters.
Historically, Hobbes would likely prescribe to a mercantilist economic policy which
stresses government regulation in commerce and accumulation of precious metals as a measure
of national strength, rather than free trade. Hobbesian skepticism would provide a likely
foundation for mercantilist thought. The lack of an international sovereign by whom the distrust
and uncertainty of states may be dispelled would validate mercantilist thought that nations
should be materially self-sufficient or at least insulated, rather than depending on the fruits of
free trade.47 Hobbes, like many mercantilist thinkers, held that precious metals should as gold
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and silver are important measures of the power of a polity: “Pecunia Aurea & Argentea, quia
propter ipsam materiam aestimantur, eximum hoc habet, ut penes unam, aut paucas Civitates non
sit, pretium eius aut augere aut minuere.” – “Silver and gold money, because they are valued
because of themselves, have this special [property] that, in the hand of one or a few polities, the
value of it is not increased or decreased.”48 Since the status inter civitates is so uncertain, fiat
currencies and commodities are subject to constant change (based on market and political
climates). Silver and gold, since they are of a limited quantity and under the jurisdiction of no
one polity, are best able to preserve value. Later authors would economically dismiss the theory
of mercantilism (among them, Adam Smith and David Hume), but Hobbes is not concerned
merely with the economics of this theory; instead, Hobbes aims at a system of insulation or
autarky (complete self-sufficiency) as a means to preserve the polity. Mercantilism, almost
completely an economic theory, may find philosophical basis in Hobbes: “the regulated economy
mercantilism and the political absolutism of Hobbes’ commonwealth are complementary in a
manner which sheds light on both.”49 The skepticism inherent in the Hobbesian system lends
itself to a mercantilistic system.
Conclusion:
The picture of the Hobbesian state of nature differs from that of the status inter civitates.
Although in the former, humans behave greedily and rapaciously, the presence of polities on the
international stage – and the different nature of polity versus human – lessens the degree of
uncertainty in the latter. Polities find it beneficial to trade internationally, for the sake of
material efficiency or acquisition. The skepticism, characteristic of Hobbes, however, still
realm of international commerce. The role of the sovereign is to order the internal parts and organs (i.e. the
various factions and individuals who comprise the polity) in an arrangement as harmonious as possible. This may
be completed by various regulations, economically through tariffs and other restrictions.
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remains. It is to the sovereign, not to market conditions such as consumer demand, that the
regulation of trade falls. This may be seen as a right of the sovereign for the sake of preserving
the integrity of the polity. For instance, one may expand the state of nature argument, not only to
violence, but to commercial activities as well. Just as physical violence or coercion may injure
individuals, so too may commercial transactions; as such, the regulation of both belongs to the
sovereign once the individual enter the polity. Historically, this viewpoint would be consistent
with (and even provide a philosophical foundation for) early modern mercantilism. The
Hobbesian polity regulates international commercial activity and, in this way, it regulates the
desires and passions of its citizens, in such a way as to preserve both their material well-being as
well as the practice of their natural liberty.
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Chapter III: Vattel – Human Nature to the Cosmopolis
This chapter looks at the international condition and the obligations of polities, as gleaned
from his Law of Nations. Although not as explicit as Hobbes in his status naturae thought
experiment, Vattel writes about human nature and the duties of the polity to its citizens. Once
those points have been explicated, the chapter will look at the international condition, with
particular regards to commerce. Vatel’s conception of human nature is much less pessimistic
than Hobbes’ conception; it views people as naturally sociable and possessing an obligation to
help one another. Nations are an outgrowth of natural sociability, and – because of this – they
are equals on the international world stage. This natural equality, coupled with sociability,
creates the foundation for the Vattelian cosmopolis or “la grande societe.” Additionally, with a
few exceptions, the rules which apply to individuals on a microscale, likewise apply to polities
on the macroscale. Commerce is seen as a means by which one man may help his fellow man.
On the international scale, commerce may also be used as a means of maintaining a balance of
power.
Human Nature and the Polity:
Vattel writes that man is naturally sociable because of both natural infirmities and the
natural language. In the Preliminaries to his Law of Nations, Vattel explicates the reason for
society:
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We see moreover that nature has refused to bestow on men the same strength and natural
weapons of defence with which she has furnished other animals – having, in lieu of those
advantages, endowed mankind with the faculties of speech and reason, or a capability of
acquiring them by an intercourse with fellow-creatures. 50

Humans lack the physical attributes of other animals – e.g. the flight of a bird or the claws of
tiger. Instead, nature – according to Vattel – has given man an ability to communicate and
harmonize with one another so that the race may thrive. Speech, according to Vattel, is the most
salient example of this natural sociability. Additionally, the nation or polity itself may be seen as
a sign of human sociability: “Agreements to establish communities or nations are consistent with
our natural interdependence, and therefore nature established the great society of nations, which
similarly requires mutual assistance.”51 Perhaps as a corollary of this idea is the first natural law;
man has an obligation beyond himself: “each individual should do for others everything which
their necessities require, and which he can perform without neglecting the duty that he owes to
himself.”52 A common motif used in natural law philosophers of the same kind as Vattel (such
as Hugo Grotius in his Mare Liberum) is the idea of sharing fire; to kindle a neighbor’s torch, by
means of one’s own, hurts no one, while helping everyone.
The formation of society is to help its constituents reach their respective forms of selfperfection. It is difficult to determine what exactly Vattel means by “self-perfection” on the
individual level. The closest explication of this is also in the Preliminaries – “The great end of
every being endowed with intellect and sentiment is happiness.”53 Vattelian self-perfection,
then, is a kind of “eudaemonism” or philosophy which focuses on the happiness of the
individual. The duties of a polity toward itself and its constituents would best inform the
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Vattelian conception of happiness. The first of these political duties is the cultivation of soil,
considered a national necessity: “every nation is then obliged by the law of nature to cultivate the
land that has fallen to its share…”54 Agriculture, then, is important. Not only does fertile and
productive land provide the necessities of life for the citizens, it is also conducive to population
growth – population itself being a national resource, useful in the defense of the polity, as well as
its technological and intellectual progress.
In addition to cultivation, Vattel also stresses progress of the arts and defense from the
external as a sovereign’s duty to his or her citizens. Vattel writes that the state has a stake in the
furthering of its constituents’ education: “The nation and its conductors ought then to protect
men of learning and great artist, and to call forth talents by honours and rewards.”55 Education is
important for military purposes (for it is from education that innovations such as gunpowder
emerge), as well as national prestige (so that bright foreigners may flock to the polity for
opportunity, thereby further augmenting state power). Additionally, and most practically, the
polity should defend itself from the violence of other polities: “one of the ends of political
society is to defend itself with its combined strength against all external insult or violence.”56 A
sovereignty, in order to remain sovereign and rule over its people, must preserve itself against
the predation of others, even by force.
The Vattelian system does not begin from a state of nature, as the Hobbesian system,
because essence and self-perfection play an integral role. As aforementioned, the world of
Hobbes is a world of particulars – there are no universals or necessary purposes. The Vattelian
world, in contrast, is one in which nations themselves are moral agents; Vattel, in the vein of
Aristotle and earlier thinkers, takes purpose as a given premise. The absence of Hobbesian
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skepticism inclines Vattel to a view more reliant on interdependence and sociability; the agents
in the Vattelian system are more predictable in that each has a better defined purpose and end –
rather than the restless seeking of power after power in the Hobbesian scheme. This entire
system may be seen as a species of response to Hobbesian skepticism; it becomes possible in
Vattel that international cooperation be both possible and meaningful.
The Vattelian conception of happiness is one that incorporates all three duties of polity to
people. The people must first be agricultural, properly utilizing all land for the sake of farming.
Additionally, they must be educated and defended from external threats.
There are, however, instances in which the people may absolve the polity; Vattel does
indeed recognize tyranny more formally than other philosophers. A sovereign (legitimate rule)
may become a tyrant (illegitimate rule) in cases of extremity: “[citizens] ought to be attempted
only in cases of extremity, when public misery is raised to such a height that the people may say
with Tacitus: ‘Even war is good for a miserable peace.’”57 Violations of political duties to an
exorbitant extent would likely constitute such a kind of misery; indeed, in pages prior, Vattel
cites the emperor Nero as one such case. A tyrant, in the Vattelian scheme, is a ruler who does
not take into account the perfection of the constituents of the individual. Other philosophers,
such as Hobbes, would argue the contrary. In the Hobbesian scheme, all order is arbitrary
because – in order for order to be distinguished from chaos – there would already need to be
some kind of coercive power.
There are, however, other more peaceful ways in which tyranny may be curbed.
Arbitration may also be used, and is indeed suggested over open rebellion: “a compromise
between the prince and the subjects, to submit to the decision of a friendly power for all the
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disputes that might arise between them.”58 Although Vattel has in mind arbitration in an older
sense (i.e. a neighboring kingdom arbitrating among royal pretenders of another), modern
analogies may be diplomatic summits in which a third party attempts to mediate. Vattel’s
deference to foreign powers in domestic matters such as the potential of civil war is indicative of
his sociable view of human nature.
The International Condition:
The natural law which governs men also governs polities on the international level, but
with two exceptions. Vattel explicitly distinguishes between the condition of individuals versus
that of polities: “social bodies or sovereign states are much more capable of supplying all their
wants than individual men are…the duties of a nation towards itself…[especially its] safety
require much more circumspection and reserve than need be observed by an individual in giving
assistance to others.”59 The differences between individual and polity, then, pertain to their
scale. Since nations are composite, they are better able than individuals to sustain themselves.
For instance, a polity is more self-sufficient than an individual in procuring the necessities of
existence because it has more resources available (many individuals) rather than an individual
alone. Additionally, since nations possess more power than individuals and the consequences of
their decisions affect a great number of people, nations should be more careful cautious in their
dealings. For instance, a man who chooses to attack his neighbor injures only one man – but a
nation who decides similarly declares war and potentially kills many more.
Nations, additionally, must respect the liberty and sovereignty of other nations. In
addition to observing the first natural law of assistance (as among individuals), nations must also
respect the autonomy of other nations: “but though a nation be obliged to promote, as far as lies
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in its power the perfection of others, it is not entitled to obtrude these office on them. Such an
attempt would be a violation of their natural liberty.”60 Natural liberty is based on the
conception that polities themselves are moral persons, and like moral persons, possess the
obligation of self-perfection: “[a polity] has her affairs and interests…thus becoming a moral
person.”61 Polities, regardless of size or prominence are equal – because each one seek its own
self-perfection. The Vattelian international condition is not as uncertain as the Hobbesian; it is
one that promotes mutual aid: “the object of the great society [i.e. international world]
established by nature between all nations is also the interchange of mutual assistance for their
own improvement and that of their condition.”62 The idea of mutual aid extends even to the
dignity of a polity’s representative or sovereign: “every sovereign and independent state deserve
consideration and respect, because it makes an immediate figure in the great society of the
human race…the sovereign represents his whole nation; he unites in his person all its majesty.”63
This is a kind of cosmopolis – or world city – in which people are obligated, rather than
skeptical, to one another. Each nation is one equal to one another and each nation deserves fair
and just treatment on the international stage.
Although the polity has obligations to other polities, Vattel holds that a nation has
obligations to itself first. Vattel writes that a nation should put itself first: “[a nation’s duties]
towards others depend very much on its duties towards itself, as the former are to be regulated by
the latter.”64 This distinction is further explicated in his perfect and imperfect duties: the former
are duties that are mandatory, while the latter are those that are merely optional.65 Perfect rights
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are those rights which pertain to political sovereignty (i.e. self-perfection), while imperfect rights
are everything else (including obligations to other polities). Nevertheless, though Vattel views
these obligations to others as merely optional on the international stage, he puts forth several
arguments friendly to free trade and international commerce.
International Commerce:
International trade, according to Vattel, is a means by which the first natural law of
mutual assistance may be fulfilled. Vattel defines commerce as beneficial: “by it every man may
still supply his want”66 and even as a type of freedom: “freedom being very favourable to
commerce…[polities] should support [commerce] as much as possible, instead of cramping it by
unnecessary burdens or restrictions.”67 Vattel views trade as a kind of peaceful intercourse
among polities – it is a way in which material necessities may be satisfied without violence or
animosity. He also equates commerce with liberty. To impose “burdens” (such as tariffs or other
ways in which trade may be limited) would be to hinder the liberty of man. International
commerce is essential to the flourishing of the people, both those of any given polity and all
those in the cosmopolis as well.
There are other passages as well which would support Vattel’s favorable disposition to
free trade – such as on his thoughts regarding military power. Vattel is skeptical regarding a
military that is too large: “The constant maintenance of numerous armies deprives the soil of its
cultivators, checks the progress of population, and can only serve to destroy the liberties of a
nation by whom they are maintained.”68 Many enlightenment thinkers, remained wary of large
standing armies because they could be used as oppressive tools of the government. Vattel
additionally points to the marginal costs of the army; that labor employed in the defense or held
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in reserve for defense may better be utilized in other industries. Vattel likely also has some
concern about war posturing. The creation of large armies, though they themselves are not war,
may precipitate war because of the fear they arouse in neighboring polities. Trade and
international commerce, without any hindrances from government and with people employed in
trade rather than war, would prosper.
International trade becomes a possibility in the Vattelian system because contracts are
valid, even without a central authority by which they may be enforced. Vattel holds justice is the
basis by which commerce is made possible and by which treaties may be enforced.69 Secondary
scholarship recognizes the Vattel’s cosmopolis as “a kind of system of reciprocal compliance and
relatively stable interactions.”70 The basis for this is man’s natural sociability, as well as an
intermingling of interests. For instance, Vattel would likely say that, should two polities be
engaged intimately in trade, they would be less inclined to war against one another and more
inclined to trusting one another. Additionally, unlike more skeptical philosophers, Vattel is open
to the idea of international coordination to suppress less sociable polities – a coordination itself
which would not necessarily limit the liberty of any polity involved.
Commerce, as noted earlier, is an imperfect right – not a perfect right; Vattel, does
however, point to commerce as a means by which an international balance of power may be
maintained. The idea of a balance of power proceeds naturally from Vattel’s conception of
international relations. If each polity is itself a moral person, and therefore equal and
autonomous, it follows that one should not become so strong as to dominate others. Vattel
recognizes that each polity is unique, and to be dominated by another would represent a violation
of natural right: “it is the interest of princes to stop the progress of an ambitious monarch who
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aims at aggrandizing himself by subjugating his neighbors.”71 Commerce becomes one weapon
in order to prevent this situation: “if a nation finds herself in such circumstances that she thinks
foreign commerce dangerous to the state, she may renounce and prohibit it.”72 Economic
sanctions are a peaceful way to curb the power of a state which would threaten the liberty of
others.73
The role of commerce in the cosmopolis is one that is both punitive and beneficial; what
Vattel seeks to preserve is an international calm rather than national integrity. The balance of
power – each polity preserving itself as it stands – is the central thesis of Vattel’s system.
Vattel’s second law of non-interference may be seen as way to preserve the status quo: “[this
law] is necessary to ward off the greater evil of the breakdown of international society that would
follow from the attempt to impose international justice.”74 For instance, a tyrannical government
may remain in power – oppressing its citizenry – with tacit approval by the international
community, so long as it enters into market arrangements. Trade is beneficial, but should a
polity grow too strong to such an extent that it threatens other polities – economic sanctions are
used to check that power. The cosmopolis is static.
The cosmopolis of Vattel has lofty goals, though they are mainly pacific. War is
generally abhorred in the Vattelian system.75 Indeed, commerce may be both a boon (to those
trading) and a way in which unruly powers may be curbed, without outright war. Scholars
postulate that – though the polity may never completely be rid of its military – it may move its
71
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emphasis from expansion to security.76 In many ways, then, Vattel may be seen as a product of
his time. He wrote in the early modern period in which nation-states and polities were first
forming themselves. Oftentimes, questions of national and political character determined
themselves by war. Economic sanctions – and the idea of a more peaceable international
condition such as a cosmopolis – would have been a welcome respite from internal warring.
Conclusion:
Vattel’s system is one that views humanity as sociable. As such, on an individual scale,
humans have an obligation to help one another. On the national level, this also applies – but with
a few caveats, adjusting for the increased scale. The most important distinction is that of not
interfering with another polity’s liberty or autonomy. This is based on the natural equality of
nations. Trade becomes a way in which polities may aid one another – and Vattel encourages it
by both his equation of it with freedom and his skepticism regarding military power. Polities,
still, however, retain the right of not trading, since all obligations are first to itself. Additionally,
since humans are sociable, polities may reasonably engage in trade with one another for
extended amounts of time. In this way, trade becomes something with which the polity may
contribute to the well-being of others, while also a means to curtail the power of worrisome
powers. It may seem like Vattel’s system is one that is static – but it, at least, makes many
allowance for peace.
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The international realm is fraught with issues regarding free trade. To whom does or
should the benefit of commerce fall? Of what kind of nature is this benefit? On the one hand,
Thomas Hobbes is skeptical to trade. His conception of the state of nature informs his
international policy. The state of nature is so cruel and abysmal that the sovereign must do
everything within his or her power to prevent it; additionally, the constituents of the
commonwealth must surrender as many rights and freedoms as possible to the sovereign to aid in
this. The right of trade is one such right. It is the duty of the sovereign to determine the correct
amount of trade to prevent the dissolution of the state and the reversion back to the state of
nature. It is not market forces, but government that determines the correct amount, since power
ultimately lies with the Leviathan. The idea behind the Hobbesian policy in trade (as well as
perhaps every other facet of his philosophy) is to incline the individual in such a way as to create
in him a desire for peace and certainty. The limitation of commerce – on both the domestic and
international scale – are part of this purpose.
The Hobbesian ideal trading state would be a “closed” system. One solution which is
commonly proposed to the Hobbesian dilemma of the state of nature is a one-world state; just as
individuals unite in a polity, so too must polities unite into a global state to dispel uncertainty.
Although this globalization idea is not necessarily antagonistic to Hobbesian premises, it is not
the only solution.77 Indeed, a more logical and attainable solution to the uncertainty would be a
“closed” system – at its most radical form, complete autarky – but milder iterations would be a
system of tariffs meant for the sustaining of domestic industries. Historically, Great Britain’s
early colonial empire (i.e. the North American possessions) would be an example of the former;

77

Williams 1996: 232: “Since aggression is not innate but arises in part from uncertainty, Hobbes’s Leviathans are
not necessarily aggressive toward one another.” Williams is working from a similar perspective as this paper: the
Hobbesian dilemma is ultimately epistemic, not necessarily material. Essentially, since the status inter civitates is
different from the status natruae, there is no need for a global state.

Martir 42

trade would only occur among those for whom there is a common sovereign by whom disputes
may be settled. Tariffs meant to stimulate or protect domestic interests would be exemplify the
latter – e.g. the institution of tax laws for foreign countries and the establishment of a minimum
wage.
Emer de Vattel is far more amenable to open trade. Vattel begins from a premise of
human sociability – that humans have an obligation to one another. A modified version of this
rule applies also to polities on the international level – in the cosmopolis. Polities may best aid
one another by means of trade – it is a pacific kind of intercourse in which all parties benefit.
Endeavors such as military service are even posited as less favorable, and trade itself is seen as a
kind of liberty. Polities still, however, maintain the right to not trade – particularly as a means of
curbing the growth of threatening nations. International powers may coordinate with one another
and use economic sanctions or trade restrictions to maintain a balance of power (and, in doing so,
preserve the autonomy and equality of states). This system is one that is at least pacific and less
inclined for war; it is ultimately a system that (with no threatening powers) would advocate free
and open trade. Vattel’s cosmopolis is less militaristic and more trusting than any Hobbesian
status inter civitates.
The Vattelian ideal trading state would not exist alone in a closed system as in the
Hobbesian scheme; it would necessarily be part of a larger more globalized community.
Ultimately, open borders and free trade would dominate such a community. It would be static, in
the sense that there is a balance of power among the polities, and – supposedly – each polity
would benefit mutually.
This paper would conclude with an endorsement of the Hobbesian over the Vattelian;
limitations of trade are necessary for the sustaining of the polity itself. The question must again
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be asked: “cui bono”? The polity must look to the well-being of its constituents; this includes a
kind of curtailing of dangerous patterns and practices. It is well-accepted that governments
regulate violence (cynically, one may look at government as an organization with a virtual
monopoly on violence), but this too much extent to the marketplace. Passions, too, are present in
the marketplace. The Vattelian system views trade as a boon and an alternative to war. The
Hobbesian system views trade as a different kind of war. Hobbes is wont to quote Cicero in his
Leviathan: “Salus populi lex suprema esto” – “Let the safety of the people the highest law.” The
safety of the people includes not only their corporeal well-being, but defense from the detriments
of the market.
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